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[B~yM rndepotic
[By Matthew S. Garnett*]I
he digital sampling controversy is
"the student author's favorite
dead horse."' Over the past de-
cade, more than 100 legal articles,
commentaries and student notes
have dealt with digital sampling
and its relation to copyright law.
2
In addition, the various constituencies in
the music industry, such as artists, compos-
ers, producers, and recording executives, have
right?6
The Bridgeport Music court responded
with an iron gavel: "Get a license or do not
sample." 7 The court interpreted §114(b) of
the Copyright Act of 1976 ("Copyright Act")
to prohibit any unauthorized sampling where
"the actual sounds [in the original] recording
are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered
in sequence or quality."8 Consequently, the de-
fensive tools of copyright infringement, such
"... the bright-line rule announced in
Bridgeport Music should not apply
where the disputed digital sample
appropriates only the'sonic' ideas of
the original work."
also trumpeted their perspectives.' In gen-
eral, the viewpoints expressed by interested
parties reflect "whose ox is being gored."4 Un-
til the landmark ruling by the Sixth Circuit in
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, how-
ever, neither the courts nor Congress 5 had di-
rectly addressed an essential question in the
digital sampling debate: to what extent, if any,
may an artist digitally sample another's work
without infringing the sound recording's copy-
as substantial similarity and de minimis tests,
are unavailable to even the most quantitatively
trifling or qualitatively transformative
sample.9 No matter if one samples 20 sec-
onds or 20 milliseconds, and irrespective of
how one slices, loops, filters, layers, or
stretches a sample, the Sixth Circuit has
adopted the Biblical attitude expressed in
Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros.
Records, Inc., ("Grand Upright"), the prime
MUSIC
mover in the digital sampling debate: "Thou
shalt not steal." 10
Notwithstanding the Bridgeport Music
decision, the text of §102(b) of the Copyright
Act plainly prohibits the extension of copyright
protection "to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, prin-
ciple, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is... embodied."11 This Note argues
that the bright-line rule announced in Bridge-
port Music should not apply where the disputed
digital sample appropriates only the "sonic"
ideas of the original work. The main thrust of
this argument is that the Sixth Circuit's hold-
ing in Bridgeport Music is inapplicable where
the disputed copying is a protected exercise of
"fair use" reverse engineering; that is, where
copying is necessary to appropriate the "sonic"
ideas embodied in the sampled work.
Part II of this Note presents a brief his-
tory of digital sampling, including its applica-
tion in the Hip-Hop musical genre. Part III pre-
sents a walkthrough of the Bridgeport Music
decision, including its procedural history, the
lower court's decision, and the Sixth Circuit's
recent amendment of its own opinion. Part IV
presents an analysis of Bridgeport Music, includ-
ing reference to the recent eruption of academic
and public reaction to the case. Part V sets aside
the bulk of prior digital sampling scholarship
to open a new front in the debate: the
"Electronica" musical genre, the "Downhill
Battle" protesters, and the innovative applica-
tions of digital sampling common to Electronica
Music. Part VI argues that certain uses of digi-
tal sampling in Electronica composition are
protectable acts of reverse engineering, and
therefore immune from the Sixth Circuit's "Get
a license or do not sample" missive. 12 Part VII
concludes that, while the result in Bridgeport
Music is probably justified, its moratorium on
all unlicensed sampling is an improvident at-
tempt to copyright uncopyrightable "sonic"
ideas.
1. A Brief (and Incomplete) History
of Sampling
A. The Life and Times of Digital
Sampling
Sampling is the act of taking "sounds"
from of a previous recording and placing them
in a new musical work.13 In the context of digi-
tal sampling, "digital" refers to a set of binary
numbers representing an audio waveform. 14
These "numbers" are determined through the
repeated measurements of the fluctuating elec-
trical currents, or analog electrical signals, com-
monly known as sounds.1 5 Because it is impos-
sible to listen to numbers directly, every sam-
pling system has both an Analog to Digital Con-
verter ("ADC") and a Digital to Analog Con-
verter ("DAC"). 16 The ADC converts the elec-
trical voltage of sounds into numbers, and the
DAC converts the numbers back into voltages
that can be output through audio speakers.17
Digital sampling, therefore, has three discrete
stages: (1) recording the "sonic" numbers in the
sample; (2) editing (or not editing) the sample
with digital audio devices; and (3) playing back
the modified (or unmodified) sample.
In 1979 the first digital sampler hit the
commercial market: The Fairlight CMI (Com-
puter Music Instrument). 8 At a cost around
$30,000, the Fairlight CMI was "dubbed" prac-
tical, and its early champions included Stevie
Wonder and Peter Gabriel.' 9 A popular appli-
cation of early digital sampling systems was to
record and playback "real" instrumental sounds
(e.g. individual recordings of notes of brass in-
struments, grand pianos etc.). 20 Limitations in
computer memory, the high costs of proces-
sors, and compatibility problems between dif-
ferent manufacturers of samplers, synthesizers,
and other digital audio devices made this prac-
tice almost inevitable. 21
The existing compatibility problems
were solved in 1983 when industry-wide coop-
eration produced the Musical Instrument Digi-
tal Interface ("MIDI"). 22 MIDI allowed digital
samplers, synthesizers and sequencers pro-
duced by different manufacturers to commu-
nicate seamlessly.23 As the 1980's progressed,
moreover, rapid advances in digital and com-
puter technology, coupled with the increased
affordability of computer memory and proces-
sors, worked to release the creative harness on
digital sampling.24 For instance, technological
developments allowed a sampling artist to iso-
late sounds from a particular instrument on a
recording, such as a single note from a Miles
Davis trumpet performance or a John Bonham
drum "kick," and then digitally alter its sonic
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characteristics to form, respectively, either an
elaborate jazz solo or an entire percussion en-
semble.
25
Today, synthesizers, effects processors,
sequencers and drum machines all work along-
side the digital sampler, and are often bundled
Jay Kool Herc, who brought his manually
spliced "funk" beats to street corners and recre-
ation centers in the South Bronx (New York
City).29 This musical fashion quickly evolved into
the musical and cultural revolution known as
"hip-hop."30
... any person with a microphone, a
computer, and either a substantial
compact disc collection or access to
the Internet, can produce
commercial rap music"
into software packages for personal comput-
ers. Deep-pocketed musicians and recording
studios no longer represent the exclusive mar-
ket for sampling systems. Software products
such as "Gigastudio 160," "Cubase SX," and
"Reaktor 4" incorporate all the constituents of
a professional recording studio, and each prod-
uct is available for less than five-hundred dol-
lars.2 6 The result is that any person with a mi-
crophone, a computer, and either a substantial
compact disc collection or access to the Internet,
can produce commercial rap music. 27 The func-
tionality and affordability of digital audio equip-
ment is therefore bereft with both benefit and
liability: a society of potential recording artists,
but also a society of potential digital sampling
bandits.
B. Digital Sampling in the Hip-Hop
Musical Genre
1. The Hi p-Hop Turn-table
Dee-Jay: rom the South
Bronx to Studio Extinction
The first musical sampling (which was
not digital) is generally credited to Jamaican
disc-jockeys in the 1960's that would, through
the use of phonograph turn-tables, combine the
sounds of previous recordings to create a vari-
ety of original rhythms and arrangements. 28 In
the early 1970's, the United States was intro-
duced to sampling by Jamaican expatriate Dee-
Throughout the mid-1970's and early
1980's, disc jockeys became increasingly cre-
ative in their use of turn-tables. For example,
they experimented with a record's playback
speed, they "looped" rhythm arrangements of
a song by mixing two copies of the same record,
and they "scratched" one or more records to
create unique rhythmic and arguably cacopho-
nous sounds.31 Given that these techniques
often involved prodigious manual dexterity, it
is hardly surprising that many disc jockeys
viewed themselves as musicians and their turn-
tables as musical instruments.
With the advent of digital sampling and
rapid technological advances in the early 1980's,
however, hip-hop producers discovered they
could easily recreate a disc-jockey's perfor-
mance with the digital sampler, often using the
sampler in conjunction with other emerging
digital audio equipment.32 Despite a traditional
disc-jockey's ability to dazzle audiences with his
craftsmanship at the turn-table (and his con-
tinued relevance as a performing artist), he nev-
ertheless faced extinction in the music studio.
33
2. Hip-Hop Sampling as Cul-
tural Communication, Theft,
or Both?
Commercial reality cannot be ignored.
Sampling in hip-hop music is a breakthrough
musical innovation, and also is credited as an
important cultural communication device. 34
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Further, sampling is fairly described as a
"mother of invention," given Hip-Hop's roots
in economically depressed areas where aspir-
ing artists could financially facilitate little more
than "two turntables and microphone." None-
theless, despite sampling's value as a nostalgic
patchwork of musical and cultural expression,
its proliferation raises the question: are Hip-Hop
musicians thieves if they do not first obtain li-
censes from the copyrighted works they
sample?35 Or is digital sampling in the Hip-Hop
musical genre merely the modern manifesta-
tion of "a time honored [and protected] prac-
tice [of borrowing in] all the creative arts?"36
Two different perspectives, amongst
dozens that impregnate the digital sampling
debate, come from two of Hip-Hop's most fre-
"grunts," should also exist outside the public
domain.40
II. "Walk this Way" as We Run
Through Bridgeport Music
A. Hip-Hop[ping] Into a Sound
Recording Lawsuit
On May 4, 2001, plaintiffs Bridgeport
Music, Inc. ("Bridgeport") and Westbound
Records, Inc. ("Westbound") brought a copy-
right infringement action 41 against over 800
defendants, mostly record companies and other
music publishing entities, that had distributed
musical works that allegedly sampled, without
authorization, portions of 476 George Clinton
r "... despite sampling's value as a nostalgicpatchwork of musical and culturalexpr s on, its proliferation raises theL question: are Hip-Hop musicians thieves
if they do not first obtain licenses from
the copyrighted works they sample?" a
quently sampled artists, George Clinton and
James Brown. Clinton, a pioneer of the "funk"
musical genre, is a member of an emerging
school of recording artists who seek to encour-
age Hip-Hop musicians (who lack the resources
to pay upfront licensing fees) to freely create in
their pursuit of artistic and commercial suc-
cess.3 7 Towards this end, Clinton released two
albums in 1992 called "Sample Some of Dis
[sic]" and "Sample Some of Dat [sic]" in an ef-
fort to provide up-and-coming artists with
samples they could use without immediate le-
gal scrutiny.38 On the other hand, Brown, af-
fectionately known as the "Godfather of Soul,"
has exclaimed: "Anything they take off my
record is mine. Is it [alright] if I take some paint
off your house and put it on mine?" 39 Many
musicians feel that because the Copyright Act
does not require a copyright holder to grant a
compulsory license to anyone, then short snip-
pets of music, such as Brown's distinctive
songs.42 In August, 2001 the original complaint
was severed into separate actions, including
an action alleging that "gangsta" rap pioneers
NWA, in their song "100 Miles and Runnin',"
("100 Miles") infringed Westbound's sound re-
cording copyright in George Clinton's perfor-
mance of "Get Off Your Ass and Jam" ("Get
Off"). 4 3
Defendant No Limit Films ("No Limit"),
a licensee of "100 Miles," distributed the song
as part of the soundtrack to its movie release "I
Got the Hook Up."44 On June 21, 2002, No
Limit filed a summary judgment motion in the
Middle District of Tennessee claiming that
Westbound's action for copyright infringement
of "Get Off's" sound recording should be dis-
missed because "(1) the portion of "Get Off"
that was copied was not original and therefore
not protected by copyright law; [and] (2) the
sample of "Get Off" [was] legally insubstantial
and... [did] not amount to actionable copy-
Summer 2005 512
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ing.
The parties did not dispute that "100
Miles" contained an edited two-second sample
of the introduction to Clinton's "Get Off." "Get
Off" begins with a three-note guitar riff on an
unaccompanied electric guitar, and lasts for ap-
proximately four seconds. The three-note ar-
peggio is repeated several times, and the "ra-
pidity of the notes and the way they are played
produce a high-pitched, whirling sound that
captures the listener's attention and creates an-
ticipation of what is to follow." 46 In "100 Miles",
a two-second portion of the riff is sampled,
"looped," and then slowed down (resulting in
a lowered pitch) to match the tempo and ar-
rangement of the song.47 The "looped" version
of the sample lasts for approximately seven sec-
onds and appears five times throughout the
song.48 Whereas in "Get Off" the unaccompa-
nied riff produces "a rising sense of anticipa-
tion," its edited use in "100 Miles" "evokes the
sound of police sirens" and is layered into the
background of the song.49
B. "Get[ting] Off" the "Hook": The
District Court's Opinion
1. The Originality Claim
Under the Copyright Act, only "origi-
nal works of authorship" are entitled to copy-
right protection."5 No Limit Films argued that
because the three-note arpeggio sampled in
"100 Miles" was "a commonly used collection
of notes" it was unoriginal and a invalid basis
for an infringement action."' In rejecting No
Limit's challenge, the District Court noted that,
in a sound recording infringement suit, it is "the
aural effect produced by the way the notes in
the ["Get Off" sample] are played" that are the
subject of the originality inquiry, not the col-
lection of notes themselves.52 The District court
concluded that No Limit's originality challenge
failed because "a jury could reasonably con-
clude that the way the arpeggiated chord is used
and memorialized.., is original and creative."
53
2. The "Legally Insubstantial"
Claim
a. The Substantial Simi-
larity Requirement
Not all copying is infringement.54 In in-
terpreting the Copyright Act55, the District Court
found that for Westbound to establish infringe-
ment of "Get Off's" sound recording copyright,
it must demonstrate: (1) copyright ownership
of "Get Off;" (2) that "100 Miles" actually
sampled "Get Off;" and (3) that the sample
amounted to an unlawful appropriation because
its edited use in "100 Miles" was "substantially
similar" to the original work.56 Because copy-
right ownership and actual copying were not
contested (for purposes of No Limit's motion),
the District Court was charged with determin-
ing whether the use of "Get Off" in "100 Miles"
"crossed the threshold of substantial similarity
as to constitute actionable copying." 7
b. If De Minimis, No Sub-
stantial Similarity
In its opinion, the District Court noted
that when evaluating the "substantial similar-
ity" prong of copyright infringement, the Sixth
Circuit has recognized that "the law cares not
for trifles," and that over-enforcement of copy-
right laws may unjustifiably stifle creativity.
58
In the view of the District Court in Bridgeport
Music, then, a "trifling" or de minimis instance
of copyright infringement was not legally ac-
tionable because it did not rise to the level of
the substantial similarity required for action-
able copying.
59
c. "Get[ting] Off" the"'Hook"'
The District Court agreed with No Limit
that the "Get Off" sample used in "100 Miles"
was de minimis, and therefore not substantially
similar to George Clinton's original recording.
60
It first compared the two works as a whole, dis-
tinguishing "Get Off" as a "celebratory song"
about dancing, whereas NWA's "100 Miles" rep-
resented a fictional narrative about four men
being pursued by the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation ("F.B.I."). 61 The District Court also
found that "there [were] no similarities in mood
or tone" between the edited "Get Off" sample
used in "100 Miles" and its unedited use in the
original Clinton recording. 62 It concluded that
no jury, even one familiar with George Clinton's
records, "would recognize the source of the
["Get Off"] sample without [being] told."6' On
this basis, the District Court granted No Limit's
motion to dismiss and held that NWA's use of
"Get Off" was de minimis, and therefore not the
Vanderbilt journal of Entertainment Law & Practice
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proper subject of an infringement action.64
C. Back in the "Dead Horse's"
Saddle: The Sixth Circuit Opinion
1. The Racing Grounds of
Westbound's Appeal
Westbound, along with Bridgeport (ap-
pealing on a separate issue) filed its notice of
appeal in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals on
November 8, 2002.65 In its brief, Westbound
argued that the District Court committed re-
versible error on two points. First, Westbound
argued that the District Court erroneously bur-
dened it, and not Defendant No Limit, with
establishing the substantial similarity element
of infringement. Second, Westbound argued
that the District Court's substantial similarity
analysis was flawed because i compared the
tone and feeling of the edited "Get Off" sample
against its use in Clinton's original work instead
of considering whether the "Get Off" sample
used in "100 Miles" constituted a "substantial
portion" of Clinton's work.6  Westbound be-
lieved that "Get Off's" introductory three-note
riff was a "signal moment" in the song and there-
fore a legally significant portion "because it
[was] placed at the very beginning of the com-
position and... [was] entirely unaccompa-
nied." 67 The Sixth Circuit's decision, filed on
September 7, 2004, rejected these arguments;
instead, it trotted through copyright law with a
different cavalry of analysis.
68
2, The Sixth Circuit Opinion
a. The Day the District
Court Opinion Died
In one swift missive, the Sixth Circuit
dismissed both the result reached and the legal
reasoning used in the District Court's opinion:
"[s]ince the district court decision... tracked the
analysis that is made if a musical composition
copyright were at issue, we depart from that
analysis." 69 Digital sampling case law hereto-
fore, from 1991's Grand Upright to the most
recent 2003 case, Newton v. Diamond - cases
that involved "composition copyright infringe-
ment [but] not sound recording infringement,"
played no role in the Sixth Circuit's opinion.
7 0
b. Hip-Hop [ping] Back to
"Thou Shalt Not Steal"
The Sixth Circuit, recognizing the
"dearth of legal authority.., and the importance
of the resolution of this issue," announced that
the "music industry, as well as the courts, [were]
best served" by the declaration of a bright-line
test to be used in resolving sound recording
infringement claims.71 The Sixth Circuit de-
clared, "Get a license or do not sample."72 In-
quiries into de minimis infringement and sub-
stantial similarity simply do "not enter the equa-
tion" when the defendant does not dispute ac-
tual copying.73 The effect of this command-
ment is that even the most quantitatively tri-
fling or qualitatively transformative applications
of digital sampling are each, absent appropri-
ate licenses, instances of sound recording copy-
right infringement. 74 Also, the Sixth Circuit
departed from the District Court's originality
analysis and declared that the requirement
"[was] met by the [mere] fixation of sounds in
the master recording... because only... the
master recording will be exactly the same as
the copyrighted sound recorded." 75
c. The Sixth Circuit's Jus-
tification of "Get a Li-
cense or Do Not
Sample"
The Sixth Circuit justified its landmark
holding primarily through its interpretation of
17 U.S.C. §114(b) to prohibit any unauthorized
sampling where "the actual sounds [in the origi-
nal] recording are rearranged, remixed, or oth-
erwise altered in sequence or quality."76 In ad-
dition, the following factors bolstered its rea-
soning: (1) sampling is never accidental; (2)
bright-line rules are easily enforced; and (3) the
holding does not significantly stifle creativity
because artists may negotiate appropriate li-
censes, or, in lieu of obtaining a license, inde-
pendently recreate the desired sample.77 The
Sixth Circuit also explained why, in its view,
substantial similarity and de minimis analysis
were unavailable to a defendant that did not
dispute actual copying.
Though the Sixth Circuit acknowledged
it was not following any legal precedent, it ex-
plained that it also "did not pull this [holding]
out of thin air."78 The Sixth Circuit cited six
different law journal articles, as well as other
legal commentary, as secondary authority.79 This
legal academia supported, or in part provided,
Summer 2005
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the court's interpretation of 17 U.S.C. §114(b),
and also bolstered its other justifications s.8 The
"dead horse" legal authors in the digital sam-
pling debate were apparently not quite dead.s
i. Interp retation of
§114(b) of the Copyright
Act
The Sixth Circuit's analysis in Bridgeport
Music "begins and largely ends" with its inter-
pretation of §114(b), the statute defining the
limited exclusive rights granted to a sound re-
cording copyright holder.82 The relevant ex-
cerpt from §114(b) states:
[T]he exclusive right to [create a deriva-
tive work based upon a copyrighted
sound recording] is limited to the right
to prepare a derivative work in which
the actual sounds fixed in the sound re-
cording are rearranged, remixed, or oth-
erwise altered in sequence or quality.
The exclusive rights [to prepare a de-
rivative work] in a sound recording do
not extend to the making or duplica-
tion of another sound recording that
consists entirely of an independent fixa-
tion of other sounds.
83
According to the Bridgeport Music court,
the precise nature of digital sampling was to
"rearrange, remix, or otherwise alter in se-
quence or quality" the "actual sounds" in a re-
cording; therefore, all songs containing samples
were derivative works and all unauthorized
sampling was copyright infringement. 4 To be
clear, the Sixth Circuit stated that only "a sound
recording owner has the... right to "sample"
his own recording. "85 The consideration of
"how much a digital sampler alters the actual
sounds or whether the ordinary lay observer
can or cannot recognize the song or the artist's
performance of it" is irrelevant to a sound re-
cording infringement case where copying is not
challenged.
8 6
ii. The Other Justifica-
tions
The Sixth Circuit thought that the pre-
meditated nature of digital sampling also
weighed against its permissibility.87 It pointed
out that a composer may perceive a melody in
her head and may believe it is her own, when
in fact it is another's work that the composer
no longer consciously recalls hearing.8 8 But this
is never the case in digital sampling - it is al-
ways an intentional appropriation of another's
work.8 9
Another factor the Sixth Circuit used
to justify its bright-line rule was its "ease of en-
forcement." 90 As a practical consideration, it
worried about the "mental, musicological, and
technological gymnastics" that would be nec-
essary were courts to adopt a de minimis or sub-
stantial similarity analysis.91 While conceding
that the District Court judge "did an excellent
job navigating these troubled waters," the Sixth
Circuit thought that the Bridgeport Music liti-
gation, which as of the date of the decision con-
tained over 800 related cases "involving differ-
ent samples from different songs," would ben-
efit from the judicial economy of a bright-line
rule.
92
Finally, the Sixth Circuit justified its de-
cision by pointing to the prevalent practice of
licensing in the music industry, and proffered
that the "market" will keep licenses appropri-
ately priced because a sound recording copy-
in a sound recording infringement
suit, it is "the aural effect produced by
the way the notes in the ["Get Off"
sample] are played" that are the
subject of the originality inquiry, not
the collection of notes themselves.
515 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Law & Practice
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right holder "cannot exact a license fee greater
than what it would cost... to just duplicate the
sample... in a new recording."93 Further, its
opinion endorsed the view that a cost-benefit
analysis "generally indicate[d] that it is less ex-
pensive for a sampler to purchase a license...
rather than take his chances [in court]." 94 Due
to the availability of market-priced samples and
the prospect of independent mimicry, the Sixth
Circuit believed its holding did not upset the
balance between "protecting original works
and stifling further creativity."95
iii. Why No Substantial
Similarity or De Minimis
Analysis
The "Get Off" sample was "back on the
hook," and no substantial similarity or de mini-
mis defense could rescue it from the black-hole
of the Sixth Circuit's bright-line. The court ex-
plained that the reason why no de minimis or
substantial similarity analysis applied was, in
addition to the dictates of §114(b), that "even
when a small part of a sound recording is
sampled, the part taken is something of value....
[and] [n]o further proof... is necessary than the
fact that the producer of the record or the artist
on the record intentionally sampled because it
would (1) save costs, or (2) add something new
to the recording, or (3) both."96 A footnote in
the opinion further explained that digital sam-
pling allows recording artists to save money by
not hiring musicians; that is, sampling allows
"the musician [to be] replaced with himself."97
3. The Decision and the
Amended Opinion
Based on the above, the Sixth Circuit
reversed the District Court's summary judg-
ment grant to defendant No Limit. 98 In be-
mused resignation, it concluded its opinion by
opining that there was no "Rosetta stone" for
interpreting the Copyright Act, and that it was
impossible to divine Congressional intent be-
cause the relevant legislative history predated
digital sampling.99
However, on December 20, 2004 the
Sixth Circuit, in addition to granting a rehear-
ing based upon the appeal of No Limit and an
amicus brief by the Recording Industry Asso-
ciation of America ("RIAA"), also amended
portions of its opinion.10 ' Two notable changes
were (1) a reinstatement of the District Court's
"originality" analysis;1 1 and (2) a comment to
the District Court inferentially inviting it to con-
sider a "fair use" defense on remand.
10 2
I11 A Survey and Analysis of Pub-
lic and Academic Reactions to
Bridgeport Music
A. Introduction
Since the Bridgeport Music decision was
published, commentary and criticism has
erupted across the Internet, in the
"blogosphere," and in other publications." 3
Unfortunately for the courts, the Internet and
its blogosphere provide unregulated hunting
grounds to flak unpopular decisions. Though
the Internet is a source to be wary of, it is no-
table that on January 12, 2005 the U.S. Supreme
Court cited its first blog in U.S. v. Booker.10 4 The
following survey and analysis of the critique of
the Bridgeport Music decision was driven, in part,
by this new cavalry of "dead horse" bloggers.
In the days and months following the
decision, three main critiques emerged on the
Internet and in the press: (1) the Sixth Circuit's
literal interpretation of §114(b) of the Copyright
Act to preclude substantial similarity or de mini-
mis analysis was erroneous; (2) the Sixth Cir-
cuit, in a continuing tradition of judicial anath-
ema, erroneously refused to consider or even
mention "fair use" as a defense to NWA's sample
of "Get Off;" and (3) the Sixth Circuit's eco-
nomic justifications for "Get a license or do not
sample" were based on faulty premises that
served to mask the stifling effect the holding
has on sample-based musicians.
10 5
B. The Interpretation of §114(b) of
the Copyright Act to Preclude Sub-
stantia- Similarity or De Minimis
Analysis
It is true that the "dead horse" authors
of the digital sampling debate, at least those
cited by the Sixth Circuit, endorsed the court's
interpretation of §114(b). Six different law jour-
nal articles, as well as other legal commentary,
were cited by the court as secondary authority.16
For instance, Susan Latham, author of an article
analyzing Newton v. Diamond, offered that
§114(b) "by its own terms preclude[d] the use
Summer 2005
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of a substantial similarity test." Similarly, Al and
Bob Kohn, authors of "Kohn on Music Licens-
ing," a legal canon in the music industry, were
cited as rejecting "judicial [application]" of sub-
stantial similarity and de minimis analysis be-
cause "it is believed.., that the courts should take
what appears to be a rare opportunity to follow
a [bright-line] rule specifically mandated by
Congress [in §114(b)]."1 0 7 The Sixth Circuit evi-
dently adopted this interpretation with little
explanation other than commenting that "[n]o
further proof... is necessary than the fact that
the producer of the record or the artist on the
record intentionally sampled because it would
(1) save costs, or (2) add something new to the
recording, or (3) both."
10 8
However, as the District Court noted in
its opinion, the de minimis principle guards
against "over-enforcement of copyright laws [that]
may unjustifiably stifle creativity" (emphasis
Because the courts, as well as legal au-
thors, have repeatedly described de minimis use
as copying that "has occurred to such a trivial
extent as to fall below the quantitative thresh-
old of substantial similarity,"113 the Sixth Cir-
cuit may have erroneously thought that de mini-
mis use was only material to the specific inquiry
as to whether actual, as opposed to actionable,
copying occurred. 1 4 In any event, its interpre-
tation of §114(b) provides for arguably absurd
consequences if its interpretation were to be
applied to the balance of the Copyright Act cov-
ering derivative work infringement.
For example, what if the Sixth Circuit's
"literal" interpretation were uniformly applied
to all derivative work infringement claims, such
as a digital sampling case involving only the
music composition copyright?"5 §106(2) of the
Copyright Act grants to music composition
authors "the exclusive right to prepare derivate
"The Sixth Circuit declared:
'Get a license or do not
sample:"
supplied).0 9 It is easy to forget that a de minimis
use of a copyrighted work is generally under-
stood as excusing infringement - and not as a
defense to claim that no infringement oc-
curred.110 Further, as noted by Kohn & Kohn,
de minimis analysis is "judicially applied"; mean-
ing that the fact that the statutory text of §114(b)
is silent to its availability does not necessarily
preclude its judicial application.""' Moreover,
the Sixth Circuit itself, in Gordon v. Nextel Com-
munications, recited the following mantra re-
garding de minimis infringement: "To establish
that a copyright infringement is de minimis, the
alleged infringer must establish that the copy-
ing of the protected material is so trivial as to
fall below the threshold of substantial similar-
ity, which is always an element of actionable
copying" (emphasis supplied).
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works," and it defines a derivative work as "a
[new] work... in which [the original] work [has
been] recast, transformed or adapted."" 6 There
is no obvious difference in meaning between
§114(b)'s prohibition against "rearranging" and
"remixing" a sound recording and §106(2)'s
prohibition against "recasting, transforming, or
adapting" a musical composition.1 1 7 It has been
argued that "under the Sixth Circuit's approach,
any adaptation of [the musical composition]
would infringe, no matter how little was actu-
ally copied."" 8 In the digital sampling cases
heretofore, however, which involved only the
composition copyright, the courts routinely
applied substantial similarity and de minimis
tests as threshold inquiries when evaluating
copyright infringement.
The Sixth Circuit also appears to be con-
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sumed by the fact that all sampling is "inten-
tional" and creates more culpability than, say,
the composer who unwittingly appropriates
another's melody as her own.119 But the de mini-
mis principle, again, is an excuse to infringe-
ment, and it is not facially clear why the "in-
tentions" of the infringer should play into the
analysis. As one "blogger" explained, the de
minimis defense does not excuse infringement
"because [it is] likely to be accidental, but [in-
stead] because it simply isn't worth the trouble
... to spend years in litigation over a three-note
guitar arpeggio." 12 De minimis analysis ought
to be an inquiry into whether judicial discretion
is appropriate to give effect the ultimate charge
of the Copyright Act; that is, to foster creativity
Use Analysis
The Sixth Circuit's analysis in Bridgeport
Music did not reach "fair use."123 Many com-
mentators feared that, with respect to §114(b),
the court had interpreted "fair use" right out of
the Copyright Act. 124 But in its amended opin-
ion, the Sixth Circuit blindsided this impres-
sion by hinting to the District Court that it was
free to entertain "fair use" as a defense on re-
mand.125 The following is a designedly attenu-
ated presentation of traditional "fair use" analy-
sis.
Unlike a de minimis inquiry, the Copy-
right Act does explicitly provide for "fair use"
as a defense to excuse copyright infringe-
ment.126 §107 of the Copyright Act provides:
"The "dead horse" legal
authors in the digital sampling
debate were apparently not
quite dead:'
while assuring authors' commercial success. The
Sixth Circuit ostensibly interpreted its discretion
right out of the Copyright Act.
Finally, despite the apparent consensus
amongst the "dead horse" authors cited in the
Bridgeport Music opinion, another objection
claims that the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of
§114(b) will create defacto retroactive liability.
121
The argument, as articulated by the RIAA in its
amicus brief, is that "[f]or more than a decade,
the music industry has conformed its conduct
to the [perceived] existing rules - obtaining li-
censes for sampling when appropriate, and re-
lying on de minimis and fair use principles if
and where [appropriate]." 122 According to the
Sixth Circuit, then, an entire industry miscon-
strued §114(b) for over a decade. The "dead
horse" authors cited by the court did not re-
flect the conventional wisdom in the music in-
dustry.
C. The Absence of Traditional Fair
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work...
for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching ..., scholar-
ship, or research, is not an infringement
of copyright. In determining ... fair use
the factors to be considered shall include
(1) the purpose and character of the use
... (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantial-
ity of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4)
the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted
work. 127
It may be immediately objected that
digital sampling does not neatly fall into a one
of §107's listed categories, such as "criticism" or
"research." However, the text of §107 speaks
only illustratively when it describes "purposes
such as criticism, comment... scholarship, or
Summer 2005
The Downhill Battle to Copyright Sonic Ideas in Bridgeport Music
research," and it was never intended to exhaust
the potential categories of "fair use" purposes. 28
Legislative intent is clear, as the 1976 House
Report to §107 explains, "there is no [intention]
to freeze the doctrine in the statute.... [T]he
courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to
particular situations on a case-by-case basis."
29
Notwithstanding, in judicial practice there is
anathema towards fair use inquiry in digital
sampling infringement cases. 3 ° In practice,
entertainment attorneys caution clients "that for
a sample to qualify as "fair use," it must be used
for purposes such as parody, criticism, teach-
ing, news reporting, research or some other
non-profit use."
Many applications of digital sampling
militate towards a finding of "fair use." For in-
stance, samples (1) whose "nature" was highly
transformative of the original work; (2) where
the "amount and substantiality of the portion
used" constituted de minimis use; and (3) where
the "effect of the use" had little bearing on the
market or value of the original or derivative
work.'13 It is designedly arguable that NWA's
sample of "Get Off" was transformative, -de
minimis, and also had little effect on the market
for the original recording, especially given that
"not even one familiar with the works of George
Clinton" would recognize the appropriation.
32
If a traditional "fair use" defense is entertained
on remand, the following two considerations
are likely paramount: (1) to what extent does
the commercial purpose of "100 Miles" weigh
against a finding of fair use; and (2), does the
ability of the "Get Off" sample to be ultimately
recognized when told of its source destroy the
"amount and substantially of the portion [cop-
ied]" prong of the fair use defense?
133
Traditional "fair use" analysis is apt to
ramble along in legal writings, often balloon-
ing its content with well-founded observations.
The four-prong balancing test set forth in the
text of §107 is a simple analytical framework -
but there is nothing easy in its application.
34
There is much to recommend in an analysis that
is not dogmatically beholden to the categories
and factors enumerated in §107. In Michael J.
Madison's comprehensive review of "fair use,"
he wrote "the question ought ... to be... whether
the [sampler's] efforts [were] more socially valu-
able than the outcome produced by allowing the
copyright holder to enjoin the use or obtain pay-
ment."135 Or as Judge Learned Hand wrote in
West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., "fair
use" is really just a question of whether "copy-
ing... has been done to an unfair extent."
136
D. Economic Un-Justifications and
Starving Artists
Mike "D," a member of The Beastie
Boys, a Hip-Hop phenomenon that has made a
"career... of transforming the sounds of the past
into.., new music,"137 recently described his
group's sample-clearing process:
It's very tedious. We have to sit there
and basically break out every single com-
ponent of every track that we do and
make a list of the sources for everything.
We go through every blip of sound and
decide what's significant enough that we
need to contact the owner. From there,
it's a whole bunch of lawyer craziness. 38
The above quote was taken from an interview
in a magazine that reported on the Bridgeport
Music decision and the change in law.
139 Will
someone please tell Mike "D" that now "every-
thing" is significant enough to require a license?
The Sixth Circuit believes that "the
market will control the license price [of a
sample] and keep it within bounds." 14° But
what is "out-of-bounds" in the context of copy-
right infringement? The fact that licenses are
"market-priced" does not demonstrate whether
the appropriate balance between "fostering cre-
ativity and assuring author[s]... commercial
success" has been tilted. 141 The reality is that
unless you are a major Hip-Hop act with deep
pockets for licenses and attorney fees, the
Bridgeport Music holding effectively bans you
from practicing the Hip-Hop art form. Even
before the Bridgeport Music decision, critics of
current licensing practices had complained of
"barrier[s] to entry for independent or devel-
oping acts."
1 42
For instance, a sound recording license
for a three-second sample will cost in the neigh-
borhood of $1500, a "looped" three-second
sample $5000, and any sample over four seconds
could "run into the tens of thousands of dol-
lars."143 A frugal Hip-Hop act can spend $60,000
on sampling fees to record an album.144 But for
acts like the Beastie Boys, who in the past have
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recorded albums where literally hundreds of
disparate snippets of music and sounds are in-
terwoven - there is almost no ceiling to the po-
tential expense.
145
The Sixth Circuit also ignored in its eco-
nomic appraisal what it conceded later in its
opinion: "Today's sampler is tomorrow's
samplee.... [and] the incidence of 'live and let
live' has been relatively high."146 If it is true
that the Hip-Hop industry has engaged in reci-
procity in cases involving de minimis or other
qualitatively insignificant samples, and in fact
has thrived under what the Recording Indus-
try Association of America ("RIAA") perceived
as "existing rules," 47 then on what basis of
copyright law can the result in Bridgeport Mu-
sic be justified? This argument does not chal-
lenge the Sixth Circuit's correct assertions that
many applications of digital sampling do "re-
place the musician with himself" and reduce
the need for studio musicians. Instead, the ar-
gument is that, on balance, fostering creativity
by allowing de minimis sampling has more net
social utility than protecting the speculative
economic interests of the original recording art-
ists'. In 1996, entertainment attorney, Robert
M. Syzmanski, prophetically wrote that "[i]t is
doubtful that anyone has ever picked up a gui-
tar in the hope that one day he will be able [to]
license a two-second sample."
48
The Sixth Circuit claimed that it ap-
peared "cheaper to license than to litigate."
1 49
If this is true, it is conceivably because record
companies do not want to volunteer as the wa-
tershed judicial guinea pig. Before Bridgeport
Music, no court had "comprehensively tackled
the complex legal issues involved in sam-
pling."50 Some argue that due to the lack of
clear judicial guidelines "an industry custom has
arisen whereby users pay for licenses even
where they do not need them."'51 What con-
stituent in the music industry has incentive to
roll the judicial dice, especially where the de
facto rules in the Hip-Hop industry have ush-
ered the musical genre into mainstream ubiq-
uity?
IV. Electronica, and the Rest of the
History of Digital Sampling
A. What is Electronica?
As a musical style, Electronica 152 does
not "employ traditional approaches to compo-
sition such as reliance on the playing of notes,
the use of overt tonality and melody, or the gen-
eration of accompaniment for vocals." 153 An
accurate recipe for an Electronica composition
is: (1) assault the listeners with tachycardia pro-
ducing tempos of 140 to 160 BPM (beats per
minute); (2) rampage their eardrums with
thumping drum kicks and enveloping bass
lines; (3) challenge their sonic sanity with in-
dustrial sounding, computer authored "notes;"
and (4) play any discernible "notes" at "physi-
cally impossible speeds or [in impossible] note
combinations." 54 The sonic anarchy and hy-
peractive cacophony of the genre has led some
to label Electronica as the only thing "worse
than rap.
"155
B. How Does Digital Sampling Fit
In?
Music composed in the Electronica style
described often achieves "the deconstructive
manipulation of sound."'56 The digital sampler
"Because of the availability of market-
priced samples and the prospect of j
independent mimicry, the Sixth Circuit
believed its holding did not upset the
balance between 'protecting original J
works and stifling further creativity'."
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is a prevalent tool towards achieving this
"deconstruction" and "abuse;" in fact, stand-
ing alone it is sufficient. For instance, a musi-
cian can use a digital sampler to copy a two
second blip of music, and without introducing
any other sounds into the production, produce
a composition complete with rhythm, melody,
and harmony.15 7 Electronica "Noise" artists such
as Masami Akita (known as "Merzbow") rely
on "hellish[ly] processed" samples from an
unending variety of sources to engage in their
sonic trench warfare. The unanticipated results
demonstrate to listeners the "range of possibili-
ties in a given [sonic] code."158
The most apt examples of
deconstructive digital sampling, however, were
recently created in specific protest of the Bridge-
port Music decision. An organization called
"Downhill Battle" began an online protest and
participants of the protest were required to cre-
ate a 30 second composition using only a digi-
tal sampler and the two-second sample of "Get
Off."'59 A total of 177 entries were received,
each composed only through the manipulation
of the sonic waveforms in the sample; for in-
stance, slicing, layering, looping, stretching, fil-
tering, smacking, flipping or rubbing down the
waveforms in the sample.16 ° One contest entry
was a satirical Electronica version of the "Star-
Spangled Banner."161 Were a listener not armed
with the knowledge of the source of these alien
sounds, it would be impossible to recognize its
source.
V. The Musical Scales of Justice:
p102(b) and the Reverse Engineer-
ing of Sonic Ideas as Fair Use
A. Introduction: Everything in
Between A Sample
One common thread to the panoply of
digital sampling scholarship is the almost
chronic adherence to Hip-Hop as the contex-
tual prism for the sampling debate. The
"deconstructive" applications of digital sam-
pling, such as were discussed regarding
Electronica composition, have gone largely ig-
nored.162 As a result, the use of digital sampling
as a stepping stone to accomplish "the
deconstructive manipulation of sound" may
have been outside the purview of the Sixth Cir-
cuit when deciding Bridgeport Music. 16 3 This sec-
tion of the Note asserts two penultimate argu-
ments: (1) the constituent elements of sound
(termed "sonic" ideas) are embedded within a
given sound recording's "sonic" expression; and
(2) that by "slicing, layering, looping, stretch-
ing, filtering, smacking, flipping or rubbing"
down the waveforms in a sample, an Electronica
artist can successfully, even if unwittingly, de-
stroy any protectable "sonic" expression con-
tained in an unedited sample. Finally, this sec-
tion argues that when the "sonic" expression
in the unedited sample is entirely absent in its
edited "final version," the sampling should be
excused as "fair use" reverse engineering be-
cause the new expression in the "final version"
was engineered by uncopyrightable "sonic"
ideas.
B. Hey! What's the Idea? §102(b)
and Reverse Engineering as Fair
Use
§102(b) of the Copyright Act demands
that copyright protection extend only to origi-
nal expression and not "to any idea." 164 Not-
withstanding, when an artist, in order to ap-
propriate the "ideas" of a work, needs to first
make an infringing "intermediate" copy, the
judiciary has enforced the spirit of §102(b)
through the application of the reverse engineer-
ing branch of "fair use."' 65  Digital sampling,
when used as a technique to discover the hid-
den galaxies of music embedded within re-
corded sound, makes a suitable candidate for
"fair use" reverse engineering analysis.
166
In the seminal reverse engineering case,
Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. ("Sega Enter-
prises"), the Ninth Circuit announced that
"where [reverse engineering] is the only way to
gain access to the ideas and functional elements
embodied in a [work] and where there is a le-
gitimate reason for seeking such access, [reverse
engineering] is a fair use." 167 The "access" and
"reverse engineering" in Sega Enterprises took
the form of an intermediate infringing copy of
software code, held to be "fair use" because the
intermediate copy was necessary to "disas-
semble" the code to excavate the "ideas" ulti-
mately used in the defendant's non-infringing
"final version."
1 68
Applying this analytical mold to digital
sampling requires comparison of sampling's
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three discrete stages: (1) recording the "sonic"
numbers in the sample, (2) editing the sample
with digital audio devices, and (3) playing back
the modified sample. 169 The first stage (record-
ing the sonic numbers) is analogous to the "in-
termediate copying" of the software code, the
second stage (editing the digital sample) is akin
to "disassembling" the code, and the third stage
(playback of the edited sample) is similar to the
non-infringing "final version" of the code
implemented in the new software.
For the analogy between computer code
and digital sampling to hold true, and there-
fore, for reverse engineering "fair use" to be a
valid defense in digital sampling cases, then,
following the Sega Enterprises framework: (a)
only the "sonic" ideas in an unedited digital
sample can remain in the edited "final version;"
and (b) the sampling artist cannot reasonably
achieve the appropriation through another
route. 7' As a threshold matter, a definition and
discussion of "sonic" ideas is necessary.
1. What are Sonic Ideas and
how are they Different from
Musical Ideas?
The courts have not had great success
in defining musical "ideas" or determining
whether more than "ideas" have been copied
in a composition infringement case.171 All that
is clear is that certain combinations of notes on
a "lead sheet" will cross the threshold from
musical "idea" to protectable "expression." 172
The ambiguity is not surprising, however, be-
cause the task of differentiating between a
work's "expression" and its embedded "ideas"
is a boundary that "[n]obody has ever been able
to fix," regardless of whether the subject mat-
ter is literary, musical, or visual.' 7' Nonethe-
less, when a sound recording of a musical com-
position is the subject of the idea/expression
inquiry, and the discussion of "sonic" ideas and
"sonic" expression is introduced, the level of
abstraction is (literally) extrapolated.
This Note offers that "sonic" ideas are
fairly described as "the constituent elements of
sound; that is, the raw matter of waveforms and
electrical currents." 74 "Sonic" expression, in
turn, can be described as "the product of these
"physics" of sound when oriented and actuated
by a performing musician." 175 The precise defi-
nitions pale in importance compared to the
question their concepts beg regarding reverse
engineering: If the "sonic" expression is re-
corded, can it subsequently be atomized and
then repackaged (creating new expression) to
an extent where all meaningful "sonic" relation-
ships in the original recording are destroyed?
7 6
2. The Downhill Battle En-
trants as "Fair Use" Reverse
Engineering
The 177 entries in the "Downhill Battle"
protest are put forth as examples of "fair use"
reverse engineering. The Downhill Battle sam-
plers, by "disassembling" the "Get Off" sample
through "slicing, layering, looping, stretching,
filtering, smacking, flipping [and] rubbing"
down the waveforms in the sample, discovered
never heard before or even imaginable sounds
buried inside the original recording.
"Work[ing] with sonic waveforms at their most
fundamental level," the entries made audible a
small sampling of the "range of possibilities in
a given [sonic] code." 177 The unedited three-
note arpeggio sampled in "Get Off" and the
Downhill Battle entries (such as the "Star-
Spangled Banner" reincarnation) share no hu-
manly cognizable expression, either musically
or sonically. Even if the discussion of sonic ideas
and expression is vague or not accepted, it is
inarguable that the musical qualities of melody,
harmony and tone been edited out of existence
in the Downhill Battle entries.
The second prong of a successful "fair
use" reverse engineering defense, that the in-
fringer could not reasonably achieve the appro-
priation through another route, is also satisfied
with respect to the applications of digital sam-
pling used by artists such as Merzbow and the
Downhill Battle participants. The sampler can-
not know what new expression will be produced
before he edits the sample. The hidden galax-
ies of sound within a sample exist in an experi-
ential vacuum where the results of the hellish
sound deconstruction are unknowable until
playing back the edited sounds. The judicially
suggested alternative route to sampling, the "in-
dependent recreation of the desired sample,"
178
is therefore incompatible with the realities of
"hellish[ly] processed" 79 samples: the sampling
artist does not know beforehand what the "de-
sired sample" will sound like in its "final ver-
sion."
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VT. Conclusion: If the Sample is Ed-
ited Beyond All Recognition, Sound
Recording Infringement Should not
Attach
Miles," and so both sonic and compositional
expression remain in the "final version" of the
sample.
This proposal is respectful of both the
Sixth Circuit's statutory interpretation of
§114(b) and §102(b)'s superseding statutory
"What constituent in the music
industry has incentive to roll the judi-
cial dice, especially where the de facto
rules in the Hip-Hop industry have
ushered the musical genre into
mainstream ubiquity?"
Attacks against the Sixth Circuit's statu-
tory interpretation of §114(b) or its economic
justifications for it bright-line rule are not espe-
cially promising in the context of the Bridge-
port Music action and its judicial resolution. It
is also unknown how the disputed "Get Off"
sample in Bridgeport Music would perform if
ultimately subjected to traditional "fair use"
analysis by the District Court on remand.
Instead, this Note proposes that the
Sixth Circuit's "Get a license or do not sample"
commandment can be superseded by §102(b)'s
statutory demand that "ideas" are never copy-
rightable. The "fair use" reverse engineering
defense under §107 can be the means to give
effect to §102(b)'s spirit. As an alternative to
tackling the judicially unmanageable vagaries
of "sonic" ideas and expression, however, this
Note further proposes that the reverse engineer-
ing test can be administered through a simple
inquiry: whether the appropriation from the
unedited sample is audibly recognizable in its
"final version," even after the listener is told of
its source and location in the allegedly infring-
ing work. If the final appropriation is not "au-
dibly recognizable," then it is "fair use" reverse
engineering, because no humanly cognizable
appropriation has occurred. By this measure,
the disputed sample in Bridgeport Music is not a
valid instance of "fair use" reverse engineering.
If one is told the source of the "Get Off" sample,
she can recognize the appropriation in "100
demand that "ideas" are not copyrightable. It
is a compromise between Bridgeport Music's
standard of absolute liability and the lower
court's (traditional) substantial similarity and de
minimis inquiries. An objection, however, is that
this proposal is indistinguishable in judicial
application from an absolute liability standard.
After all, since all "audibly recognizable"
samples infringe under this proposal, and a
sample's source cannot be identified unless "au-
dibly recognizable," then the results of Bridge-
port Music's standard and this Note's proposal
are seemingly identical. However, this objec-
tion ignores the reality that under the Bridge-
port Music rule, mere knowledge of a sample's
origin can establish liability. This Note's pro-
posal, however, removes the prospect of
"knowledge" as sufficient to establish liability
creativity. Therefore, it fosters creativity in two
ways: (1) Electronica artists do not need to seal
their recording studios from persons who might
inform on their sampling habits; and (2)
Electronica artists will never fear engaging in
frank discussions of their sampling sources and
editing techniques.
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